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The ruling Communist Party of Moldova (CPM) is popular and has good chances of 
succeeding in the ballot without abusing its power, even though its victory is unlikely to 
be as massive as the one in 2001. However, if electoral abuse on a larger scale is 
uncovered, widespread opposition protests may take place, but even then it is rather 
unlikely that the opposition should reach for power according to the "Ukrainian variant". 
What are the stakes? 
The parliamentary election will be held in Moldova on 6th March. Candidates contend 
for 101 mandates in the one-house parliament. Shortly after the ballot, the parliament will 
elect the next president of Moldova. The regulation under which the parliament elects the 
president by a qualified majority (61 out of 101 votes), enacted in 2000, has significantly 
increased the importance of parliamentary elections, in which the stake is in fact the 
entire power in the country. Presently, the Moldovan parliament and the executive are 
dominated by the CPM. The communists have 71 mandates, and the CPM leader 
Vladimir Voronin is the country's president. In the upcoming election the communist 
party will face two serious competitors: the Democratic Moldova coalition (DM) and the 
Christian-Democratic People's Party (CDPP), which staged the anti-government 
demonstrations that lasted for several months in the spring of 2002. 
The candidates and their chances 
The communists won the local elections in May 2003. The CPM garnered 48 percent of 
votes in the elections for City and Regional Councils, in which parties presently forming 
Democratic Moldova won 30 percent votes, and the CDPP - 7 percent. On 17th February 
two pre-election polls were published. According to a survey by the International 
Institute for Humanitarian and Political Studies, the CPM may hope for 48-49 percent of 
votes, DM for 25-26 percent, CDPP for 10-11 percent, and the Social Democratic Party 
of Moldova (SDPM) for 8-9 percent. According to the CIVIS analytic centre, the 
communists are backed by 61.1 percent of voters, DM by 20.9 percent, CDPP by 12.1 
percent, and SDPM by 4.4 percent (below the electoral threshold). The remaining parties 
did not reach the electoral threshold in either of the polls (the threshold is 6 percent for 
single parties, 9 percent for blocs comprising two parties and 12 percent for blocs of three 
or more parties). The polls thus suggest that a victory of the communists is almost 
certain, although the scale of their win remains to be seen. The CPM may well win 
absolute majority in parliament again, but it is less likely that the communists should get 
a qualified majority that would enable them to elect the president single-handedly. The 
DM bloc will probably garner 20-30 percent of votes. Christian Democrats of the CDPP 
have a stable electorate and get around 8 percent of votes in successive ballots. This time 
their showing will probably be similar, or slightly better. 
The campaign 
Moldovan parties frequently resort to populist slogans in their campaigns. The CPM 
pledges to transform Moldova into a modern European state over the next parliamentary 
term. It promises a rise of salaries to US$ 300 per month, 100 thousand new jobs, and 
higher pensions. Democratic Moldova claims it will create 100 thousand new jobs, 
increase salaries to US$ 250-300 per month, reduce taxes, build free housing financed 
from public funds for the poorest, and increase pensions. The CDPP promises to reduce 
poverty, create 200 thousand new jobs, and increase average salaries to EUR 250 and 
minimum pensions to EUR 90. 
Judging by the general character of the campaign, it targets a desperate public of a society 
in which salaries average US$ 71.5, pensions oscillate around US$ 17.5, and more than 
half a million citizens (the total population being 4.4 million) work abroad, most of them 
illegally. 
Moldovan democracy under communist rule  
In the mid 1990s Moldova was regarded as a model example of democracy among the 
CIS members. When the communists came to power in 2001 certain abuses were 
committed, for example several Christian Democrat opposition deputies had their 
parliamentary privilege cancelled (this decision was subsequently repealed under 
international pressure), and several "disobedient" journalists were fired by the state radio 
and television. The public media are controlled by the ruling team, while private 
television channels and radio stations usually have limited reach. There is more freedom 
of opinion in the press market. The circulation of opposition newspapers accounts for 65 
percent of the combined circulation of all Moldovan newspapers, pro-government papers 
accounting for 35 percent. 
Will the vote be democratic? 
The authorities have declared that they want a democratic, transparent and fair election. 
On 10th January the Moldovan president Vladimir Voronin invited the OSCE, the 
Council of Europe and the European Union to send in observers. In the public media, the 
presence of officials running in the elections was reduced to the necessary minimum as of 
the beginning of the electoral campaign, i.e. 1st January. 
Nevertheless, there have been reports on abuses on the part of the authorities. The CPM 
filed its election application even before the law on the commencement of the electoral 
campaign was published in the Official Journal. As a result, the communists got the 
tactically superior first position in the list of candidates. Members of the ruling team use 
"administrative resources" for the purpose of their campaigns (official transport, official 
telephones, and field "working visits" of high administration officials who are obviously 
electioneering). Opposition parties complain about police surveillance of their electoral 
meetings and incidents involving the police, such as the removal of CDPP's electoral 
banners in Ungheni, pressure on electioneers exerted by the security forces or even 
arrests of campaigners, as reported by the SDPM. 
Finally, there is the problem of providing an effective opportunity to vote to Moldovans 
working abroad (the opposition's potential electorate) and to Moldovan citizens residing 
in the separatist Transnistria. 
The West on the election 
On 10th and 11th December 2004 delegates of the Venice Commission (advisory body of 
the Council of Europe) visited Chisinau where they evaluated the Moldovan electoral 
laws as very good. On 9th February the European Union appealed to the authorities of 
Moldova to hold free and fair elections. The US Department of State communicated on 
17th February that the abuses committed by the authorities in the course of the campaign 
were alarming and put the legitimacy of elections into doubt. A clash in the relations 
between the West and Moldova came with the protest of the communist electoral club 
leader Victor Stepaniuc. On 9th February Stepaniuc objected to the financing of the union 
of non-governmental organisations called "Coalition-2005" Civil Coalition for Free and 
Fair Elections by western countries and organisations. On 11th February the embassies of 
seven EU Member States, the US embassy and the OSCE Mission issued a statement 
saying that their support for Coalition 2005 was provided within the framework of pro-
democracy programmes and was not meant to support any particular party. 
Russia on the election 
The electoral campaign has brought on a serious deterioration of Moldovan-Russian 
relations. In the run-up to the ballot, the government camp stepped up its anti-Russian 
rhetoric. What is more, contrary to Moscow's expectations, no CIS observers were invited 
to Moldova. 
Moscow appears to be closely watching Moldova's unfolding campaign. However, since 
all major political forces in Moldova oppose the stationing of Russian troops in 
Transnistria and call for Moldova's participation in the Euro-Atlantic integration 
structures, Russia has very little room for manoeuvre. All it can do is try to force 
president Voronin to mitigate its policies where they affect Russia's interests. To this end, 
the Russian authorities and the media co-operating with them have been carrying out a 
propaganda campaign. They have repeatedly accused Moldova of violating international 
agreements (e.g. concerning the access of international observers to Transnistria or 
participation of the separatist republic's citizens in elections), and of an anti-Russia spy 
mania (several tens of Russian Federation citizens have been detained in Moldova in 
recent months). Russia has also threatened to impose economic and visa sanctions. 
Wordings of this kind were included in the Duma resolution passed on 18th February and 
in several statements by the Russian Foreign Ministry. 
Does Moldova face an outbreak? 
In January the Chisinau City Council allowed the CDPP's to hold rallies meant to express 
the public's assessment of the ballot in the central square of the city in the post-election 
period (7th - 22nd March). The request to hold such rallies suggests that the Christian 
Democrats intend to stage protests following the election, even if there are only minor 
cases of electoral fraud on the part of the authorities. Democratic Moldova may join the 
CDPP's protests. The two opposition camps are co-operating although there are some 
clashes in their relations. 
Holding a fair election is in the best interest of the present authorities. It will deprive 
radical opposition of arguments justifying protests. The communists are popular and they 
are in a position to succeed in a fair election, even if the success is going to be less 
spectacular than in 2001.  
Further developments will depend mostly on whether the governing camp choose to hold 
fully democratic elections. The opposition is intent on unsparingly pinpointing any and 
all abuses in the course of the ballot. It remains to be seen whether this is going to spark a 
widespread protest campaign after the election, although some kind of protests will 
certainly take place. The opposition's activities are apparently inspired by the Ukrainian 
and the Georgian revolution, and the events that accompanied last year's elections in 
Romania. Opposition journalists predict that that the "rose revolution" and "orange 
revolution" scenario will repeat itself on the Dniester. The ruling communists, on the 
other hand, maintain that the revolution has already taken place: in 2001 the CPM 
reached for power and dismantled the criminal oligarchic and business system. 
It seems that no democratic revolution of the Ukrainian or Georgian type is going to take 
place in Moldova. The behaviour of the communists to date suggests that they intend to 
adhere at least to the basic principles of democracy. The democratic system of 
government in Moldova functions better than it did in Ukraine under Leonid Kuchma, 
and much better than in Georgia under Eduard Shevardnadze. On the other hand, the 
opposition has radicalised to some extent, and partly consolidated as two co-operating 
camps. The CDPP has already demonstrated its ability to stage lasting protest campaigns. 
Democratic Moldova has managed to unite a wide range of parties, and Serafim 
Urechean, one of its leaders, is a very popular politician.  
 
